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Abstract  
Throughout the Cold War period the Japanese maintained a largely 
inflexible approach to their role and place in international affairs. Even in 
2009, the major security policies of Japan are based upon the Japan-US 
security alliance and the US remains the first and only signatory security 
partner for Japan. However, in the post-9.11 world, much more 
accommodation with international norms would be required. Japan needs 
alternative security partners to work with. Australia, together with New 
Zealand, is considered the eligible candidate. Therefore, the paper will 
rationalise the prerequisites towards the complementary security 
arrangements within Japan, Australia, New Zealand and the U.S. The 
effectiveness of the ‘JANZUS’ is boldly examined from various points of view.  
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Introduction  
 
Throughout the Cold War period the Japanese maintained a largely inflexible 
approach to their role and place in international affairs. Even in 2009, the major security 
policies of Japan are based upon the Japan-US security alliance and the United States 
remains the first and only signatory security partner for Japan.  
In the post-9.11 world, however, much more accommodation with international 
norms would be required. Japan needs alternative security partners to work with. 
Australia, together with New Zealand, is considered the eligible candidate for Japan’s 
security companions.  
In fact, the Japan-Australia security ties have been steadily upgraded with the 
post-Cold War phenomena and particularly developed since 2001. The Joint Declaration on 
Security Co-operation (JDSC) signed by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and 
Australian Prime Minister John Howard in March, 2007,1 was not only a political rhetoric 
but a result of sufficient efforts of all the parties concerned. For Japan, it was the first 
diplomatic arrangement on permanent security cooperation with a country other than the 
United States since the end of Second World War. The historic significance of the 
declaration has been profound as is that fact that Australia was chosen by Japan.  
Meanwhile, New Zealand has been considerably interdependent with Japan in 
various fields to date, and its deep-rooted political/economic/social links with Japan might 
continue in the foreseeable future. Though Japan-New Zealand security ties are rather 
limited in comparison with those of Japan-Australia in 2009, as New Zealand is an 
indivisible security partner of Australia, the Japan-New Zealand security links are likely 
attained.  
Nonetheless, Abe’s successor Yasuo Fukuda, who gained office in September 2007, 
and Fukuda’s successor Taro Aso, who gained office in September 2008, had not fully 
committed themselves to maintaining such a ‘strategic thinking’ of Abe, but both had 
expressed the importance of this newly created tie.2 The Australian Prime Minister Kevin 
Rudd, who established the government in November 2007, too, showed his intimacy with 
China,3 but maintained a strong supporter of the United States, and accordingly, the 
                                                          
1  See details in Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation, DFAT, March 13, 2007. 
[http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/japan/aus_jap_security_dec.html] 
2 See details in speeches by Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda to the 168 session of the Diet, October 1, 
2007; those by Prime Minister Taro Aso at the Fifth Australia-Japan Conference in Tokyo, November 
19, 2008.  
[http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/hukudaspeech/2007/10/01syosin_e.html]; 
[http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/press/enzetsu/20/easo_1119.html] 
3 Prime Minister Kevin Rudd clearly mentions in the interview with Jim Middleton, Newshour, ABC 
Radio Canberra Australian, February 20, 2008; ‘My attitudes about trilateral relationships between 
Washington, Tokyo and Canberra haven’t changed. They have not changed since the year dot. And that 
is, I welcome the current level of dialogue and cooperation between those three governments. But I 
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security links with Japan.  
Regrettably, though the Prime Ministers looked having similar positive and 
pragmatic perceptions towards the Japan and Australia security relationship, the situation 
was fast deteriorating. In 2008, Japanese whaling in Australia’s Antarctic ‘whaling 
sanctuary’,4 put cold water over the continuing momentum based on the JDSC. Stephen 
Smith, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Australia, stated in his speech in Japan that the 
Australian government was gathering evidence of Japanese whaling for potential use in an 
international legal case.5  
Nonetheless, in September 16, 2009, Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama established 
the government which the Democratic Party of Japan (JDP) firstly led the coalition in 
history and he held talks with the Australian Prime Minister Rudd in New York, taking the 
opportunity at the at the United Nations Summit on Climate Change on September 23. 
During the talks, the two leaders discussed Japan-Australia bilateral relations, the North 
Korean issues, and nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Prime Minister Rudd and 
Prime Minister Hatoyama each explained initiatives to build a comprehensive community 
in the Asia-Pacific region and an East Asian community that the leaders advocate, 
respectively.6 
However, it is not yet clear that how the Japan-Australia security relations could 
serve as instruments for regional security.  
Therefore, this paper will review the past driving forces which had hastened Japan 
to strengthen security ties with Australia, indicating some difficulties for further advance. 
Then, with implications to New Zealand, desirable approaches of JANZUS namely 
Japan-ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand and the United States) arrangements in future 
will boldly be suggested.7  
 
                                                                                                                                                       
believe that’s where it most appropriately should stand, into the future.’ 
4 See ‘Humpbacks still in Japan's sights’, theAge.com., December 20, 2007 - 2:49PM. 
5 Stephen Smith, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Australia, stated in his speech at the Press 
Conference, Japan National Press Club on February 2, 2008; ‘The Australian government has 
commissioned the Oceanic Viking to conduct a monitoring and surveillance operation to endeavour to 
gather evidence of Japanese whaling for potential use in an international legal case to potentially 
make the point in an international legal case that the Australian government’s view and the view of 
the Australian people is that this is not scientific research.’  
[http://www.foreignminister.gov.au/transcripts/2008/080201_pc.html]. 
6 Address by the Prime Minister of Australia, The Hon. Kevin Rudd MP, on December 4.  
[http://www.pm.gov.au/node/5424] And that by H.E. Dr. Yukio Hatoyama, Prime Minister of Japan, 
September 24, 2009. [http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/hatoyama/actions/200909/24ny_e.html] 
7 This paper was originally presented at the 2008 ISA (International Studies Association)’s 49th Annual 
Convention: BRIDGING MULTIPLE DIVIDES in San Francisco, California, USA, March 26-29, 2008 
and modified/updated for the present situations. 
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1 For a new diplomatic horizon  
 
An idea existed amongst a few Japanese politicians and their advisors who had 
strongly assisted the JDSC. They believed that the link between Japan and Australia was 
as of a geo-historical course and Japan felt comfortable to invite Australia to Japan’s 
diplomatic horizon.  
This idea was deeply rooted in their glorious memory of the past.  
In 2005, when the Japan’s humanitarian activities of the Ground Self Defense Force 
(GSDF) troops in Iraq were secured by the Australian Defence Force (ADF) and the British 
Force, which were committed to the internal security of Iraq,8 this collaboration reminded 
people of the glorious memory of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and what they had had in the 
First World War.  
In the traditional balance of power context, Japan viewed Australia, together with 
New Zealand as natural partners of the Western powers.  
In the early twentieth century, some decades after the opening of modern Japan by 
the Meiji Restoration in 1868, the signing of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1902 advanced 
Japan’s desire ‘to become a respected Asian leader amongst the white men’s club’.9 Japan 
was very proud to be a partner of the British Empire and saw Australia and New Zealand 
as comfortable companions to work with. Japan considered Australia/New Zealand to be 
indirect allies through the pax-Britannica bond.  
During the First World War, when the United Kingdom requested the Japanese 
Imperial Navy ship Ibuki to escort Australian and New Zealand forces to Egypt as a 
mission of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, Japan’s contributions as an ally were offered 
without any hesitation.10  
However, even during the period of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Australia's attitude 
remained very reluctant,11 in comparison with that of the United Kingdom or even New 
Zealand. Australia's traditional perceptions of threat were rooted in its distance from 
Europe, cultural isolation, and overwhelming fear of cultural invasion.12 The idea of the 
                                                          
8 After the withdrawal of forces of Dutch in March 2005, the security of Al Muthanna, where the GSDF 
was despatched to, was maintained by the forces of U.K. and Australia. 
9 Japan observed that the European colonial powers had destroyed Chinese autonomy and took note of 
the lessons to be learnt from China's experiences. Japan preferred therefore to open the country on a 
more equal footing. [See details in Naoko Sajima, 'Japan: Strategic Culture at a Crossroads' in Ken 
Booth and Russell Trood (eds.), Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific Region (Macmillan, London, 
1998), pp.69-91.] 
10 Ever since a scale model of the Ibuki has been on exhibition in the Wellington Maritime Museum, 
with the inscription: 'Thank you for your friendship'. The Wellington Maritime Museum is located at 
Queen's Wharf, Wellington, New Zealand. 
11 See Alan Dupont, Australia's Threat Perceptions: A Search for Security, Canberra Papers on 
Strategy and Defence No.82 (Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, 
Canberra, 1991), pp. 10-11. 
12 See Geoffrey Blainey, The Tyranny of Distance: How Distance Shaped Australia's History (Sun 
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'Yellow Peril' did not mean a military threat but rather a fear of Asian immigrants who 
might disrupt the Australian way of life.13  
Australia's mistrust of Japan was so rooted that Australia questioned Japanese 
control over the Pacific. Australia had a different view of Japan from the United Kingdom, 
which sparked the 'Japanese problem' in Australia. This view was embedded in the 
Immigration Act in 1901, the National Defence League in 1905, and other aspects of the 
White Australia policy, which somewhat discouraged the Japanese dream of equal status 
with the European powers.14  
Accordingly, the first indirect alliance did not continue for long. Japan’s primary aim 
of modernisation as a basis for acceptance as an international power in the Western 
alliance was once fulfilled when the country ranked amongst the Big Five at the Versailles 
Peace Conference at the end of the First World War. However, thereafter, the Japanese 
were inflicted with ‘a sense of deep-felt isolation’ in the world, whilst failing to be respected 
by fellow Asians.  
Japan’s modernisation, linked with disengagement from Asia and association with 
Europe (datsua’nyuo) resulted in more harm than good, because it invited jealousy and 
suspicion from the West, as well as fear and hatred from Asia.15  
During the Second World War, Japan which espoused a pan-Asian liberation ideology, 
confronted Australia/New Zealand. Japan bitterly fought against Australia and New 
Zealand. Particularly, Australia experienced the first attack upon its soil in the history of 
European settlement.16  
                                                                                                                                                       
Books, Melbourne, 1967). 
13 Alan Dupont concluded in his book Australia's Threat Perceptions: A Search for Security, 'these 
xenophobic images were powerful evocations which fuelled and reinforced the nation's security 
neurosis'. [Dupont, Australia's Threat Percetions, op. cit., p.92.] 
14 Desmond Ball has argued: The fear, hostility and suspicion that characterised Australian attitudes 
towards Japan in the 1920s were based on racial prejudice and ignorance rather than objective 
strategic analysis or any prescience of the events which were to unfold into the war in the Pacific in 
1941. [Desmond Ball, 'Australia's Strategy for Asia-Pacific Security', Paper prepared for an 
international conference on 'Asia-Pacific Collective Security in the Post-Cold War Era', co-sponsored by 
ISODARCO and the Institute for National Policy Research (INPR), Taipei, held in Taipei, Republic of 
China, on 12-14 April 1995, p.4.] 
15 Regarding the concept of Great East Asian Doctrine, see Akira Irie, Power and Culture: The 
Japanese-American War 1941-1945 (Harvard University Press, Cambridge Mass., 1979), pp.120-1; 
Joyce C. Lebra (ed.), Japan's Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere in World War II: Selected 
Readings and Documents (Oxford University Press, New York, 1975); Sumio Hatano, 'Foreign Minister 
Shigemitsu Mamoru and the Greater East Asian Declaration of 1943', International Relations, Vol.109, 
May 1995, pp.38-53; Testuya Sakai, ‘The Political Economy of the New East Asian Declaration of 1943', 
International Relations, Vol.97, May 1991, pp.51-66. 
16  Japan’s objective was to thwart the US-Australia line and Tokyo conducted the so-called 
Hokugo-sakusen (North Australia Operation). (See details in Senshi Sosho, the War History Series, 
which is a series of 102 volumes, was compiled by the Military History Department on the history of 
World War II. The compilation was conducted from 1966 through 1980. Although the Senshi Sosho has 
already gone out of print, it is available for public reading at the Military Archival Library at the 
National Institute for Defense Studies, Japan.) This aimed at cutting US logistical support to 
Australia and targeted the huge air and sea gap of the Western Pacific. Australia was seen as a real 
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Though, with the unconditional surrender of Japan in August 1945, the Second 
World War ended, an observer speculated: ‘If the world had been ready to accord Japan the 
equality and fair treatment Japanese liberals sought in the post-World War I years, it 
would not have driven Japan into an economic and strategic corner where military fascists 
were able to seize control’.17  
Therefore, not a few Japanese analogically believed that if Australia, hopefully 
together with India, which used to hold considerable supporters of a pan-Asian liberation 
ideology, assisted Japan and its diplomatic initiatives, next time, things might develop 
better than before. Since the First World War was the last war which Japan won, and 
Japan’s first and last prime-time had quickly eroded, the ideas as such had continued to 
smoulder.  
In fact, former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe desired to strengthen the relationship 
with Australia and India as was demonstrated in his book Utsukushii kuni e (Towards a 
beautiful country).18 Then, upon becoming Prime Minister on September 26, 2006, Abe 
began upgrading the bilateral relationship with Australia expressing the intention of a 
closer alignment with fellow democracies Australia, the United States and India in his first 
speech to the Diet as Prime Minister.19 He also signalled support for collective defence and 
indicated changes in Japanese strategic thinking. In a speech entitled ‘Alliance 
Democracies Security Architecture for the Asia-Pacific region’, Abe expanded on this theme 
and his vision for Japanese foreign policy.  
In particular, he spoke about the need for pro-active diplomacy. As well as affirming 
the United States as the cornerstone of foreign policy, Abe stressed the importance of 
strengthening partnerships with countries that might share fundamental values such as 
democracy, rule of law and basic human rights. Notably Abe specifically mentioned India 
and Australia as countries with which Japan shared fundamental values and the desire to 
promote exchanges at the top level and strengthen economic partnerships.  
Abe’s sworn friend, the former Foreign Minister Taro Aso in Abe’s cabinet who 
become the Prime Minister in 2008 and left in 2009, too, assumingly stated to stretch it 
into ‘Arc of Freedom and Prosperity’ as Japan's expanding new diplomatic horizons.20 
                                                                                                                                                       
enemy of Japan. 
17 Edward A. Olsen, 'The Evolution of Japan's Security Policy Options' in Young W. Kihl and Lawrence 
E. Grinter (eds.), Security, Strategy, and Policy Responses in the Pacific Rim (Lynne Rienner, Colorado, 
1989), p.126. 
18 Shinzo Abe, Utsukushii kuni e (Towards a beautiful country) (Bungeishunju-sha, Tokyo, 2006). His 
idea about India was clearly stated in the speech at the Parliament of the Republic of India, 
‘Confluence of the Two Seas’ by H.E.Mr. Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister of Japan, August 22, 2007. 
[ http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/pmv0708/speech-2.html 
19 Shinzō Abe, ‘Speech to the 166th session of the Diet’, January 26 2007. 
[http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/abespeech/2007/01/26speech_e.html] 
20 Speech by Mr. Taro Aso, Minister for Foreign Affairs on the Occasion of the Japan Institute of 
International Affairs Seminar, ‘Arc of Freedom and Prosperity: Japan's Expanding Diplomatic 
Horizons’, November 30, 2006. [http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/fm/aso/speech0611.html] 
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What had encouraged Abe and Aso was the quartet (Japan, Australia, the United 
States and India) successful collaborations of international disaster relief activities in 
Indonesia (earthquake, tsunami) in 2005.21  
More importantly, Washington was very happy with their statements.22  
However, in both Japan and Australia, there arose various criticisms towards such 
dogmatic ideas, and many people were concerned about China’s reflection.23  
Then, with sudden withdrawal of Abe’s Prime Ministership in September 2007, it 
was a matter of course that this new diplomatic horizon and the idea of Quadrilateral 
Dialogue had all gone too soon.  
Moreover, since 2008, Japan’s ‘scientific research’ whaling has been repelling many 
Australians.  
 
2 Loyalties towards ‘Washington’  
 
There existed a strong belief in both Japan and Australia, that the United States 
was only master of them and the security ties with the United States were the only device 
for their strategic options. Therefore, both Japan and Australia led by Prime Ministers who 
believed this idea were most significant participants in ‘a coalition of the willing’, led by the 
United States. For them, Japan-Australia security link was a by-product of the loyalties 
towards ‘Washington’.  
Following the major terrorist strikes against the United States on September 11, 
2001, Japan, led by the Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, deployed the Maritime Self 
Defence Force (MSDF), fuelling ships en route to the Indian Ocean in support of US and 
British operations in Afghanistan.24 Koizumi, who came to office in March 2001, supported 
the United States’ war on terrorism. Though constitutionally, Japan could not participate 
in the war against Iraq in 2003, after the war, in early 2004, Koizumi showed strong 
leadership and dispatched around 600 troops to Iraq. Their mission was humanitarian 
assistance but it was the first time the GSDF had worked in the place where the real battle 
was taking place.  
In parallel, Australia aggressively assisted President George W. Bush and his war on 
terror. Australia deployed special military forces to Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003). In 
addition, the horrific attacks of October 2002 in the Bali islands, in which many Australian 
                                                          
21 See details in http://www.mod.go.jp/j/news/2005/03/0322a.htm. 
22 During the visit of Vice President Richard Cheney of the United States to Japan in February 2007, 
Abe mentioned that he would like to have a quartet meeting, involving Japan, the US, Australia, and 
the Republic of India. [http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/press/2007/2/0223.html] 
23 For instance, see Taylor, Brendan, ‘Limits to Security Cooperation’, The Japan Times, March 22, 
2007. 
24 The missions of MSDF fuelling ships expanded to other coalitions including Australia and New 
Zealand. 
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tourists lost their lives, accelerated Canberra’s enthusiasm for the defence restructuring 
process in order to tackle new threats of terrorism.25  
New Zealand, too, participated in the war in Afghanistan. And even though New 
Zealand did not act on the basis of the US alliance, it made the political decision to assist in 
Iraq’s reconstruction independently.26 
Furthermore, given their strong concerns regarding weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD) and missile proliferation, both Japan and Australia/New Zealand have been 
participating in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), which President Bush 
announced in Poland in May 2003.  
Some differences were that Japanese Self Defence Forces (JSDF) had to operate 
their new roles within budgetary restrictions, whilst both Australia and New Zealand had 
flexibly increased their defence expenditures for their expanding missions. (See Diagram 1 
and Diagram 2.)  
Indeed, in the Cold- War period, the rigid bond through the United States, the 
so-called hub and spokes links in the Asia Pacific, largely defined their strategic positions, 
though the circumstances including historical legacies and socio-cultural diversities did not 
allow them to form a ‘Pacific Pact’ as a comprehensive collective defence system as of North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO).  
Given the nature of the Cold-War, which was in effect a global confrontation between 
the United Sates and the USSR, the United States maintained a firm stance against all 
challenges. On the European front, the NATO was created. The United Sates also started 
to take a tough line against the communism in Asia. In this context of global confrontation, 
Japan was a keystone of the US military strategy in the Asia-Pacific region. Moreover, for 
the US economic and industrial interests, it was also necessary for the United States to 
secure Japan on the US side. After several years of being occupied by the Allied Powers, 
Japan joined an alliance with the United States,27 whilst Australia/New Zealand formed 
the ANZUS relationships.  
In fact, the ANZUS Treaty came into existence during the chaos of the aftermath of 
the Second World War. In order to ensure their own security and that of their region, 
Australia and New Zealand tried to gain a military guarantee from the United States, 
whilst the United States in turn expected Australia and New Zealand to undertake the role 
of defending the Asian and Oceania regions against the onslaught of communism.28  
However, during the era, many regional problems were addressed in the wider 
                                                          
25 Department of Defence, Australia’s National Security: A Defence Update 2003. 
26 See the Section Six. 
27  Regarding the US Occupation Policy and Japan’s independence, see Makoto lokibe (ed.), 
International Relations, Vol.85, May 1987. 
28 See W. David McIntyre, Background to the ANZUS Pact: Policy-Making, Strategy and Diplomacy, 
1945-55 (Canterbury University Press, Christchurch, 1995). 
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perspective of Cold-War. The US allies felt they could count on automatic intervention by 
the United States, whenever a potential for conflict arose in the region. Meanwhile, by 
following the line of US security policy, allies were able to enjoy the status and power of 
their big brother. These security frameworks were the basis of relations between Japan, 
Australia and New Zealand since the early 1950’s.  
Japan viewed Australia/New Zealand as the crucial members of the West and 
share-holders of the Free World. As members of the Western alliance, they shared in the 
economic prosperity of the ‘free world’. The US assurances allowed its allies to develop 
remarkable economic linkages and deepened their relationship.  
Moreover, Japan and Australia were often referred to as the northern and southern 
anchors of the free world or Western position in the Western Pacific. This analogy clearly 
represented the Pentagon’s view of Japan and Australia’s places in the Cold War era. Japan 
and Australia were parallel ‘anchors’ and the United States treated Japan and Australia as 
a ‘knife and fork’. Japan was for deterrence, whilst Australia was for operation. They were 
‘a pair’ in the United States’ global strategy throughout the Cold War period.  
Amongst the three allies, namely Japan, Australia and New Zealand, Australia had 
the most intimate alliance relationship with the United States in the fight against the 
threat of communism. The actual ratio of troops per population of Australia had been 
continuing very high and these tendencies have continued to date. (See Diagram 3.)  
Moreover, not only providing forces for participation in the wars, but hosting of 
important US facilities by Australia since the 1960s, at Northwest Cape, Pine Gap and 
Nurrungar also confirmed Australia’s status as a close ally of the United States.  
The origins of the alliances and security perceptions throughout the Cold War period 
were not the same as those of Washington. Japan and Australia, together with New 
Zealand, were bound tightly and collectively felt obliged to support US efforts against the 
USSR, although they were allies, their roles in practice were in contrast. Japan and 
Australia/New Zealand collectively contributed to the alliance but did not jointly work for it 
throughout the Cold War period.  
In the Cold War era, each country fulfilled its security role for the US deterrence 
strategy in a different way as a member of the Western alliance. Whatever their motives 
were, these postings were welcomed by the United States.  
In fact, with the change in the international environment, especially with the 
modernisation of the nuclear deterrent policy of the Unites States since the 1970s there 
arose a difference of outlook between the ANZUS countries in regard to the alliance.29 In 
mid-1980s, ANZUS faced difficulties in alliance managements and the United States lastly 
abandoned its security obligation for New Zealand. It was the so-called ANZUS Crisis.30  
                                                          
29 See details in David Lange, Nuclear Free: the New Zealand Way (Penguin Books, New York, 1990). 
30 About the ‘ANZUS Crisis’, there published various analysis. Some of these are; Stewart MacMillan, 
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Nonetheless, by the end of the Cold War, the bipolar US-USSR confrontation, which 
made the geo-strategic position of Japan and Australia critically important for the global 
strategy of the United States, had disappeared, and their security agendas drastically 
changed. However, there remained the strong beliefs that allies must contribute to the 
US-led world order.  
Actually, unlike Europe and even other parts of the Asia Pacific, tensions were still 
high in Northeast Asia in 1990s. There remained tremendous military capabilities from the 
Cold War confrontation in the Russian Far East. These included weapons Russia 
transferred from west of the Urals and others relocated from Eastern Europe after the 
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty took effect.31 Russian forces were 
under reconstruction, but both the Japanese Defense Agency and the Pentagon observed 
that future military trends might be uncertain. On the Korean peninsula too, tension had 
heightened over North Korea’s suspected development of nuclear weapons and its research 
and development on extending the range of a surface-to-surface missile, the Nodong.32 
Such developments could be destabilising not only in Northeast Asia, including Japan, but 
also in the Asia-Pacific region, including Australia/New Zealand.  
Being delayed to adjust for emerging trends, the most important security role of 
Japan in the post Cold War period was thought to draw the US attention to that part of the 
world and to let ‘strategic change’ occur gradually and cautiously. As long as the US 
military presence was acceptable or at least acquiesced in the region as an irreplaceable 
factor in regional stability, the Japanese contribution to the security environment must be 
reconciled in this perspective.  
Therefore, after several years of groping, the United States declared in early 1995 
that the presence of US forces in the region, comprising approximately 100,000 personnel, 
would be maintained through the beginning of the twenty-first century.33  
Having accepted this, the Japanese government decided to continue shouldering 
expenses for the stationing of US forces to increase the reliability of the Japan-United 
States Security Treaty.34 Then, in April 1996, the Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security, 
which showed the direction of bilateral cooperation for the 21st century, was signed at the 
Japan-U.S. summit meeting in Tokyo. Thus, affirmation of the role of the alliance in the 
                                                                                                                                                       
Neither Confirm nor Deny: The Nuclear Ships Dispute between New Zealand and the United States 
(Allen and Unwin, Wellington, 1987); Henry S. Albinski, ANZUS: The United States and Pacific 
Security (University Press of America, Lanham Maryland, 1987); Dora Alves, Anti-Nuclear Attitude in 
New Zealand and Australia (National Defense University Press, Washington, D.C., 1985). 
31 Japan Defense Agency, Defense of Japan 1994, p.43 
32 Ibid., p.34-57. 
33 US Department of Defense, Office of International Security Affairs, United States Security Strategy 
for the East Asia-Pacific Region (US Government Printing Office, Washington DC, February, 1995), 
p.32. 
34 The cost of hosting US troops in Japan has been continuing over US$5 billion, which means an 
average of 11 per cent of Japan's total self-defence budget. 
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post-Cold War era was settled. As Article VI of the Japan-United States Security Treaty 
stated, the Treaty’s second objective was to contribute to the maintenance of international 
peace.35 People recognised that the Treaty was not only a military alliance but aimed at 
broader mutual cooperation between Japan and the United States.  
Moreover, following the reaffirmation by the Joint Declaration of the role played by 
the Japan-US partnership in the maintenance of peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific 
region, the two countries formulated the new ‘Guidelines for Japan-US Defence 
Cooperation’ in 1997. In order to ensure the effectiveness of the Guidelines, Japan enacted 
the ‘Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in 
Areas Surrounding Japan’. Through these agreements, the two countries have studied joint 
defence planning for armed attacks against Japan and cooperative planning for situations 
in areas surrounding Japan. Furthermore, Japan established the Coordination Mechanism 
which aimed to coordinate the respective activities of the two countries in emergencies.36  
Simultaneously, the conservative Australian Liberal Government, inaugurated in 
1996, started to redefine its position as an ally of the United States. It publicly supported 
American naval intervention in the showdown between China and Taiwan during the 
latter’s presidential election in March, and it offered to pre-position American military 
weapons and supplies on Australian soil. In December, the ‘Sydney Statement’, which 
reaffirmed the Australia-US security relationship, was announced.37 Indeed, a majority of 
‘ordinary Australian’ who supported the conservatives in the election, including Prime 
Minister John Howard, thought that the former Labor Government’s use of regional 
multilateral forums during the early to mid-1990s did not produce the expected outcomes, 
namely both regional integration and acceptance as a regional power.  
The Howard Government published its first defence white paper, Australia’s 
Strategic Policy, in 1997 and showed a strong willingness to revive traditional security 
approaches, and to place a great deal of weight on the bilateral US alliance.38 
Importantly, the Asian economic crisis of 1997 devastated many regional economies, 
causing political and economic instability throughout the region. Consequently, there was a 
feeling of drift in Australia’s past Asian diplomacy. These were reflected in a number of the 
Prime Minister’s foreign policy pronouncements, including the observation that Australia 
acted as America’s ‘deputy sheriff ’ following its successful leadership of the International 
                                                          
35 'For the purpose of contribution to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace 
and security in the Far East, the United States of America is granted the use by its land, air and naval 
forces of facilities and areas in Japan' (Article VI), Japan-United States Security Treaty. 
36 Japan Defense Agency, Defense of Japan 2004, pp.131-148. 
37  The comparative studies between the Japan-US security new arrangements and ANZUS 
redefinition are in Naoko Sajima, ‘Changing ANZUS: the future of Northern and Southern anchors’, 
International Affairs, No. 446, May 1996, pp.22-39. 
38  Department of Defence, Australia’s Strategic Policy, (Directorate of Publishing and Visual 
Communications, Canberra, 1997). 
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Force East Timor (INTERFET) mission in 1999. 39  However, spearheading the East 
Timorese liberation from Indonesia damaged relations with Indonesia.  
After 1997, there was a steady diminution of regional multilateralism, which had 
urgently emerged since early 1990s. This, combined with increased regional instability, 
meant that it was important to be able to act as facilitators for US military diplomacy, in 
order to maintain and enhance East Asia’s geopolitical status quo ante. This sentiment was 
shared by both Japan and Australia in late 1990s and to step up policy cooperation and 
coordination; bilateral security links between Japan and Australia were urgently needed. 
The first Japan-Australia politico-military talks were officially started in 1996, after 
several unofficial meetings. Various defence exchange programmes, including ‘High-Level 
Defence Officials,’ ‘Regular Consultations between defence officials’ and ‘unit to unit 
defence exchange’ have also been promoted. 40  The so-called ‘historical legacies’ or 
remnants of the past did not prevent bilateral rapprochement. These security 
collaborations between Japan, Australia through the United States, led JDSC in 2007.  
Japan and Australia have approved participation in the US ballistic missile defence 
(BMD) plan. In 1998, Japan decided to begin joint Japan-U.S. technical research on a 
sea-based upper-tier missile defence system and the Howard government signed up to 
participate on December 4, 2003.41 Though no decision was made on specific formats 
between Japan and Australia for their coordination, both would like to be framed in the US 
global missile defence strategy at the time.  
These links of three countries have been variously described by commentators, such 
as the relationship of ‘anchoring trilateralism’,42 a ‘little NATO’, ‘shadow alliance’43 or 
cynically ‘regional minilateralism’.  
Regrettably, the international environments including turmoil in Iraq and with the 
departure of Koizumi and Howard (and Bush in January 2009) are substantially altering 
this sense of unity now. 
 
3 Within multilateral frameworks  
 
There were analyses that Japan could and should play new and appropriate security 
roles within multilateral frameworks in both the collective security mechanism, namely the 
                                                          
39 This provoked strong antipathy amongst the Southeast Asian countries. (i.e. New Strait Times, 24 
September, 1999; Bangkok Post. 29 September, 1999). 
40 Japan Defense Agency, Defense of Japan 2004 (Inter Group, Tokyo, 2004), p.301. 
41 Senator the Hon. Robert Hill, Australia to participate in US Missile Defece Program, Media Release, 
December 3, 2004. 
42 Anna Searle and Ippei Kamae, ‘Anchoring trilateralism: can Australia-Japan-US security relations 
work?’, Australian Journal of International Affairs, Volume 58, No.4, December 2004, pp.465-478. 
43 Purnendra Jain and John Bruni, ‘Japan, Australia and the United States: little NATO or shadow 
alliance?’, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Volume 4, No. 2, 2004, pp.265-285. 
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United Nations, and the region. In this context, Australia might play an important role for 
Japan.  
Since the end of the Cold War, a mechanism to guarantee peace in the Asia-Pacific 
region had been conspicuous by its absence, though the Asia-Pacific region had been 
groping for a new security framework. Neither in Northeast Asia nor in the whole 
Asia-Pacific, has not been there a multilateral region-wide structure, or any design for it. 
In the Cold War era, it was widely believed that the reason why alliances with external 
powers in the region were mostly bilateral was that there were no shared cultures, no 
shared values, and no experience of international rules. However, some of the difficulties 
for a multilateral security approach in the region were caused by remnants of colonial 
domination and the civil conflicts that followed the push for independence. Even an 
ideological dispute - four of the five remaining communist countries in the world are in Asia 
(China, North Korea, Vietnam, and Laos) - developed from different ideas about what 
forms independence should take.  
To begin implementation of trust-building measures throughout the Asia-Pacific, 
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) was firstly formed in 1994. However, it would be a difficult 
step.44 Japan and Australia were major proponents of this goal in the ARF and their 
partnership was indispensable.  
In multilateral frameworks, there have already been two outstanding interactions. 
One was the formation of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) process, and the 
other has been the evolution of Cambodian peace initiatives.  
In APEC, which was formulated from the Pacific Basin Economic Council (PBEC), 
through the Pacific Trade and Development Conference (PAFTAD), and the Pacific 
Economic Cooperation Council (PECC), Japan could exercise leadership over these four 
regional institutions with Australia's assistance.45  
The second Cambodian peace process, in which Japan played a positive role at the 
Tokyo Round Table in 1991, was made within the framework of the United Nations at 
Australia's initiative. Japan was able to contribute to the Cambodian peace initiatives with 
the dispatch of Japanese SDF personnel as members of the peacekeeping forces.46  
In both cases, Japan was supported and encouraged by Australia. At the same time, 
Japan can lend support to Australia's regional engagements.  
Luckily, under the Labor Government, in early 1990s, Gareth Evans, the Minister 
                                                          
44 Paul Dibb, How to Begin Implementing Specific Trust-Building Measures in the Asia-Pacific Region, 
Working Paper No.288 (Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, 
Canberra, 1995), p.l. 
45 See a comprehensive research in Mie Oba, Ajia-taiheiyo Chiikikeisei he no Dotei (The long course of 
forming Asia Pacific Region) (Minerva Shobo, Tokyo, 2004). 
46 See the process and the result of UNTAC in Hugh Smith (ed.), International Peacekeeping: Asian 
and Regional Perspectives (Australian Defence Studies Centre, Australian Defence Force Academy, 
Canberra, 1993). 
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for Foreign Affairs and Trade (1988-1996), consistently suggested to develop a new pattern 
of security cooperation amongst various countries in the region.47 Australia already had a 
unique links of the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) with New Zealand, Malaysia, 
Singapore and the United Kingdom but subsequently Australia had sought to go beyond 
past linkages to develop an interlocking web of contacts, dialogue arrangements and 
cooperative strategies in whole Southeast Asia. Australia had repeatedly expressed its 
appreciations of Japan’s participation in the regional security framework, which the 
Australian Labor Government was pursuing.  
Meanwhile, the past Japanese behaviour had constrained Japan’s attitude towards 
regional political engagement. Japan was very hesitant to participate in the new ideas of a 
regional security framework, because of the fear that its intentions might be 
misunderstood by neighbours. Japan has much to offer as a democracy leading economic 
modernisation in Asia but its participation in the international community had been held 
back by political constraints, whilst Australia has substantial experience in multilateral 
initiatives.  
Nonetheless, those who had contributed to the process of past economic cooperation 
between Japan and Australia in 1970s and 1980s were confident that, to form multilateral 
security frameworks, ties with Japan-Australia might be strengthening. These arguments 
had commonly been shared by academics/bureaucrats and repeatedly echoed in 1990s.48  
Then, the political momentum, in 2006 and 2007, as previously described, gave the 
opportunity to embody their ideas. There was considerable evolution in discussions 
including a series of government/think-tank led conferences. Through the proceedings of 
such conferences, the values of their security ties which might comprehensively contribute 
to the foundation of multilateral security mechanisms were emphasised and presented to 
policy-makers.49  
                                                          
47 In July 1990, Senator Evans proposed a conference on security and cooperation in Asia, which 
became the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP)－analogous to the European 
CSCE－and developed proposals for the reduction of US naval forces in the Pacific. Though these 
CSCAP proposals did not eventuate, Australia had encouraged a multilateral framework for security 
dialogue in the region, not only by utilising the existing framework of economic cooperation such as 
APEC for that purpose, but also by enthusiastically assisting the foundation of ARF in 1994. [Gareth 
Evans, Australia's Regional Security, Ministerial Statement (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 
Canberra, 1989). See also Gareth Evans, Managing Australia's Asian Future, Third Asia Lecture, 
Asia-Australia Institute, University of New South Wales, 2 October 1991; Gareth Evans and Bruce 
Grant, Australia's Foreign Relations (Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 2nd edition 1995), 
pp.348-52; Gareth Evans, 'Australia in East Asia and the Asia-Pacific: Beyond the Looking Glass', 
Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol.49, No. l, May 1995, pp.102-4.] 
48 See such as Akio Watanabe, Akio Watanabe, Ajia Taiheiyo no kokusaikankei to nihon (International 
relations in the Asia Pacific and Japan) (Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, Tokyo, 1992); Peter King and 
Yoichi Kibata eds., Peace building in the Asia pacific region: perspectives from Japan and Australia 
(Allen & Unwin, NSW, 1996). 
49 One of the most influential proceedings amongst various conferences is William T. Tow, Mark J. 
Thomson, Yoshinobu Yamamoto and Satu P.Limaye eds., Asia-pacific security: US, Australian and 
Japan and the new security triangle (Routledge, New York, 2007). 
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Therefore, the goals of the declaration were clear and precise: a number of 
multilateral initiatives (working together to strengthen APEC, ASEAN Regional Forum, 
East Asia Summit and a shared reform agenda for the United Nations), a desire to deepen 
the economic relationship as part of the strategic relationship and guidelines on how to 
strengthen bilateral security ties (annual meeting of Foreign Ministers, policy dialogue at 
Secretary/Vice Ministerial level and dialogue at senior officials level).  
However, in 2000's, the Asia Pacific as a whole, the former multilateral liberalisation 
approaches such as APEC have become at low ebb. Instead, the more objective and 
bilateral approaches such as the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) are now in fashion. Agendas 
are not the same amongst all countries but have become more individual. In the security 
context, the approach might be focussed on targeting more to solve ‘issues’, such of North 
Korea, by means of power concerts, such as ‘Six Party Talks’,50 rather than to constitute a 
rule based multilateral organ for a whole region.  
 
4 In searching for new roles as responsible players  
 
In the post-Cold War world, both Japan and Australia were expected to create not 
only new security roles as allies of the United States but also act as global/regional players.  
The end of the Cold War brought about radical changes in the security environment, 
but Japan could not immediately reformulate its security policies. In spite of its enormous 
economic contribution, including Official Development Assistance (ODA), Japan continued 
to be cautious about sharing global/regional security responsibilities. Japan was restrained 
in deals relating to security concerns outside the Japan-United States security relationship. 
Accordingly, the panic occurred at the time of the Gulf crisis in 1991. Japan could not 
respond as did other international members by participating in the Multinational Task 
Force. As a result, although Japan provided US$12 billion to the cost of the war,51 Japan 
was not amongst the countries thanked by the Kuwaiti government after the crisis in a 
New York Times advertisement. This left Japan with ‘deep-felt isolation’ in the 
international community more than it had felt for seventy years.52 Japanese policy makers 
suddenly realised that the ideas behind its security policies, which had been firmly 
maintained in the ‘Long Peace’53 of the Cold War, were out of date.  
Japan therefore began a journey in search of its own security posture and role in the 
                                                          
50 ‘Six Party Talks’ is consisting of the U.S., Russia, China, Japan, North and South Korea. 
51 In fact, minesweeping activities by MSDF in the Persian Gulf were conducted after the war from 
April to October in 1991. 
52 According to Ichiro Ozawa, ‘Japan suffered a serious defeat in the Gulf War period.’ [Ichiro Ozawa, 
Blue Print for a New Japan: The Rethinking of a Nation (Kodansha International, Tokyo, 1994), 
pp.36-9.] 
53 John L. Gaddis, The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War (Oxford University 
Press, New York, 1987). 
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post-Cold War world.  
Nonetheless, as long as the Japanese defence build-up had occurred within the 
context of US force deployment, it did not exacerbate the regional arms race. Because the 
US Seventh Fleet had guaranteed Japan’s trade routes through the South China Sea for 
almost fifty years, Japan’s restrained defence build-up over this lengthy period had eased 
the region’s suspicions towards Japan. These views were not pleasant for the Japanese, but 
could not be ignored.  
As Singapore’s elder statesman, Lee Kuan Yew, had repeatedly said, as long as the 
United States-Japan security relationship remained viable, Asian states need not fear a 
major Japanese naval or air build-up to protect Japan’s maritime trade routes and access 
to Persian Gulf oil. They believed that for this Japan had foregone the development of its 
own power-projection capacity, specifically aircraft carriers and long-range bombers.54 As 
long as Japan did not develop an independent long-range force projection capacity, Korea 
and China would be less tempted to strike out with their own forces.55 Therefore, the 
Japanese security aim must be a part of the global strategy of the United States. When 
Japan restricted its own defence posture, and at least as long as its security intentions 
were within the framework of alliance activities, Japan’s neighbours have accepted them.56 
It is difficult for Japan to undertake security initiatives unilaterally. In order to avoid such 
biased neighbours’ views and to normalise the relations with neighbours, Japan’s security 
activities were to be rationally regulated within the international/regional framework and 
supported by other partners in the region.  
By chance, the Cambodian peace process, which was encouraged by the change of 
international climate, forced Japan to take drastic measures to improve the situation. 
Japan, as a regional major actor, need to not only show political leadership but also make 
peacekeeping efforts under the United Nations. Though Japanese academic attitudes were 
very hesitant, and though public opinions were divided, in 1992, the government lastly 
determined the ‘Basic Guidelines for Japan’s Participation in Peacekeeping Forces’ (the 
so-called Five Principles) and send the GSDF to the United Nations Transitional Authority 
in Cambodia (UNTAC). It was a first time for Japan to participate in international 
peacekeeping activities. The GSDF engineering battalion splendidly worked under a 
distinguished Australian commander of UNTAC.  
                                                          
54 Sheldon W. Simon, 'East Asian Security: The Playing Field Has Changed', Asian Survey, Vol.XXXIV, 
No.1 2, December 1994, p. 1052. 
55 Quoted in ibid. 
56 These situations were the exactly the same as those of Italy and Germany. Both countries have 
self-restricted their military capacities and might limit their activities within those of alliance, namely 
NATO. However, after the end of Cold War, in the European theatre, together with the so-called 
European process, NATO has demographically and geographically expanded. In fact, these expansions 
of NATO have caused a number of controversies of Italy and Germany. Nonetheless, they could have 
collaborated with other NATO counties to cope with these agendas. Conversely, Japan has been alone. 
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Then, through the UNTAC activities, Japan realised that Australia had been 
similarly but more aggressively searching for its security roles at that time.57 Moreover, 
Australia was already experienced in the field of international security, which Japan 
sought to emulate. Japan’s insufficient military knowledge and experience made it naive, 
whilst Australia was confident. Japan needed to pay considerable attention to its 
neighbours, building security relations with them became very delicate work. On the 
contrary, from Japan’s perspective, it does not need to be as cautious in its dealings with 
Australia. Japan thought that Australia might be in a similar position in the Asia Pacific 
region. Because of Australia’s status as a descendant of the colonial powers, Japan could 
develop relations without the need to exercise as much caution as it did in its relations with 
its neighbours.58  
In due course, Japan came to see Australia as a co-player in regional security. 
Australia looked like the only country in the region with enough capacity to cope with the 
readjustment to the new environment. Especially, its ‘middle-power’ diplomacy looked 
outstanding.59  
Indeed, the 'long peace', allowed Australia’s challenge to be a leader of emerging 
‘middle-power’.60 Australia considered it a middle power,61 despite its continental size, and 
could take diplomatic initiatives amongst them. For that purpose, in general, Australia has 
the time and capacity to plan external policies towards new horizons supported by a 
defence in depth strategy.62 Australia has a comfortable margin more than any other 
nation. Its diplomatic options are various, in the changing international circumstances, 
especially new regional security environment, whilst a country like Japan needs to trade to 
survive.  
One of the areas in which Australia found its diplomatic horizon was the initiatives 
to institutionalise the global arms-control and disarmament regime. The establishment of 
                                                          
57 See the details in Hugh Smith (ed.), International Peacekeeping: Asian and Regional Perspectives, 
loc. cit. 
58 In reality, the Australian was concerned with the legacies of the past more than the Japanese and 
did not welcome such suggestions. 
59 Yoshihide Soeya, 'The evolution of Japanese thinking and policies on cooperative security in the 
1980s and 1990s', Australian Journal of International Affairs, No.48, 1994, pp. 87-95; Yoshihide Soeya, 
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61 Paul Dibb, Towards a New Balance of Power in Asia, Adelphi Paper No.295, May 1995. See also 
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‘the Australia Group’, which aimed to operate, licensing/export controls, was a result 
amongst various other ambitious efforts.  
In mid-1980s, Australia, which had consistently sided with the United States during 
the ANZUS crisis, took this opportunity to reconsider its whole security policy and from 
this time on moved from dependency on the United States to an independent defence 
posture. One of the measures that facilitated this approach was cooperation, to the extent 
that internal interests would permit, with island states which already advocated a regional 
approach. This united approach led to the adoption of the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone 
Treaty in August, 1985. In the South Pacific, security cooperation had been moving forward 
in a number of ways, in the form of military cooperation and information exchanges etc. 
Defence cooperation, such as the supply of patrol craft, exercising, provision of information 
etc. was also much in evidence between Australia, New Zealand and the island states.63 
Moreover, Strategic Review 1993 set the process of adapting Australia’s strategic and 
defence policies to the post-Cold War world and Defending Australia: Defence White Paper 
1994 emphasised further close multilateral and bilateral engagement with the region.64 
One area in the White Paper clearly influenced by the government’s emphasis on regional 
engagement was defence cooperation with Indonesia.65 This policy reached a climax when 
the Australia-Indonesia Agreement on Maintaining Security was signed in December 
1995.66 (See the image of Australia’s operation in Diagram 4.)  
Indeed, Prime Minister Paul Keating (1991-1996) and his Labor government wished 
Australia to be considered an Asian country in regional multilateral forums. In late 1995 
when Senator Evans was asked if ‘Asia’ might include Australia, he definitely said ‘I 
believe, yes’.67 
However, Labor’s idea of finding a path towards security ‘with Asia not against 
Asia’68 had not eventuated to the degree that it could have during the early to mid-1990s. 
In March 1996, regrettably, when the first Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) was held, 
Australia was excluded, despite its enthusiastic efforts to be included.69  
                                                          
63 In 1987, Australia decided to introduce the ANZAC-type frigate and this led to the promotion of 
closer defence relations with New Zealand, New Zealand agreed to purchase two frigates for delivery 
in 1997 and 1999 with an option, to be exercised by November 1997, to purchase two more on the 
original conditions. However the decision did not materialise. 
64  See Department of Defence, Strategic Review 1993 (Defence Centre, Canberra, 1993) and 
Department of Defence, Defending Australia: Defence White Paper 1994 (Defence Centre, Canberra, 
1994). 
65  Peter Jennings and Jenelle Bonnor, Australia's Regional Diplomacy, Paper prepared for the 
Asia-Australia Survey 1995 (Centre for the Study of Asia Australia Relations/Macmillan, Canberra, 
1995), pp.8-9. 
66 See the details of its process in Naoko Sajima, ‘Naze-kyotei-ha-musubaretaka? (Why was the 
Agreement signed?)’, Gaiko-jiho, No.1333, 1996, pp.50-78. 
67 Sydney Morning Herald, 2 August 1995. 
68 See Department of Defence, Defending Australia: Defence White Paper 1994 (Defence Centre, 
Canberra, 1994). 
69 See James Cotton and John Ravenhill eds., Seeking Asian Engagement: Australia in World Affairs, 
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A new regime in the region, which Australia idealistically pursued, was never 
established. On the contrary, the Asian financial crisis in 1997 corrupted the idea of 
Asia-Pacific regionalism before it was materialised. In the early 1990s Australia expected 
to be a regional initiator but lastly suffered from exclusion. During this period, Japan 
cautiously converted itself from a hesitant (doubtful) flatterer to a responsible player and 
saw Australia in a similar light. In the post-Cold War era, from the Japanese perspective, 
there existed common security ground where Japan and Australia were able to work 
together in order to maintain their common interests in a new strategic environment. 
However, despite this mutual interest, until the mid-1990s there was still a significant 
difference in each country’s approach to regional security.70 From the early 1990s, Japan 
and Australia have individually searched for ways to cope with the uncertainties and 
uneasiness of the post-Cold War world. Then, as described before, when the Coalition 
government came into office in 1996, there was a feeling of drift in Australia’s past Asian 
diplomacy.  
Nonetheless, in the case of the East Timor Crisis, Japan could not participate in 
INTERFET activities, in which Australia/New Zealand was largely involved, because of 
constitutional restrictions but from February 2002, in response to a request to participate 
in peacekeeping operations (PKO) by the United Nations Transitional Administration in 
East Timor (UNTAET), Japan dispatched its largest JSDF’s units. In December 2001, 
Japan had amended the ‘International Peace Cooperation Law’ to lift the suspension on the 
JSDF’s participation in the core operations of the peacekeeping forces (PKF).  
Above all, though Japan and Australia did not fight together against common 
enemies during the Cold War period, the strategic relationship between the two countries 
was clear and well managed in the global context. With the end of the Cold War, the 
principal common threat against Japan and Australia disappeared. However, this did not 
mean the disappearance of common ground for Japan and Australia in maintaining their 
own peace. There was already a close economic relationship and common interests had 
been cultivated in various fields. There were also several firm reasons for Japan to believe 
that strategic cooperation with Australia might favourably work in the post-Cold War 
world. In searching for new security roles as responsible players, Japan’s irresolute 
attitudes and Australia’s rough-and-ready methods finally came together and developed.  
In the cases of both UNTAC and UNTAET, the United States was aside. Australia 
was not America’s ‘deputy sheriff ’, but solely capable enough to provide public goods of 
                                                                                                                                                       
1991-1995 (Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1997). Up to 2009, Australia has been an outsider of 
ASEM. 
70  In 1995, the author published a monograph entitled Japan and Australia: a new security 
partnership?, from the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University. 
Many Australian colleagues were sceptical of the working paper’s conclusions. Only a few showed 
interest in such a ‘unique approach’ but cited various obstacles, particularly ‘historical legacies’. 
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security, together with New Zealand for the region, whilst Japan had gradually got 
self-confidence as a responsible player in regional security.  
In the post-Cold War era, Australia tried to take more independent responsibilities 
and became more influential in the region, whilst Japan needed the alternative 
comrades-in-arms. Through such case by case approaches, Japan and Australia had 
continued cultivating their bilateral security ties.  
However, there were several cases in which they did not work with one another.  
From the end of 1990s, there arose much political turbulence in Pacific islands, such 
as Fiji and the Solomon Islands. These small islands, the so-called ‘arc of instability’, have 
lacked their internal security governance and law enforcement capacity. There has been a 
notable shift from fighting between states to localised intra-state issues and defence forces 
needed to restore internal stability. In this context, the security assistances of Australia 
and New Zealand to the Solomon Islands since 2003 were cases of successful commitment 
for them, whilst Japan did not show any clear visions of its roles for such vulnerable states 
in the region.  
 
5 To supplement Japan’s defence capability  
 
After several years of wandering, the Japanese policy makers lastly realised that the 
ideas of its security policy which had been firmly maintained in the ‘Long Peace’ of the Cold 
War were out of date. Defence-means of Japan which had been implicated by the bi-polar 
nuclear deterrence theory were not sufficient to respond to the expectations of the 
international community,71 whilst the public could not catch up with such a reality. 
Regrettably, most social-science academics had not long associated with the defence and 
security studies and could not show any national strategy.  
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), Japan, which was following the US path in 
most of the Cold War period, did not have any capacity to show the initial strategy for the 
new environment. When Iraq invaded into Kuwait in 1990 and Japan firstly needed to 
solely decide its international security contribution, MOFA could not make any appropriate 
agenda-settings. Because MOFA was long far from the domestic policy-makings procedures, 
its bureaucrats could not handle them appropriately.72  
Defense Agency (up-graded to the Ministry of Defense in 2007) bureaucrats 
(so-called Civilians) too, could not show enough initiatives in and after the Gulf Crisis. 
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Though the defence bureaucrats were long thought the key elements of the so-called 
civilian-control system, as advisory bodies, which meant the predominance of politics to the 
military affairs, their actual abilities were limited. Their advices toward the Minister 
looked enhancing the civilian-control mechanism. However, in fact, they were mainly 
pursuing the defence budget build-up planning and never experienced the national crisis 
itself. Their views were very inward looking and lacked a sense of strategic thinking. They 
were facing hardship to adjust themselves to the international security trends.  
Moreover, defence issues were long taboo in ‘peaceful’ Japan for more than forty 
years. Not only the public but also the both politicians and academics had omitted to argue 
them openly and widely. Defence arguments in Japan were not sophisticated enough to 
apply to the real world. ‘Defence’ had long been of domestic political sensitivity. Therefore, 
what defence bureaucrats mainly focused on was how to protect administrative procedures 
from the humiliation by the opposition groups, media and Diet debating. It was beyond 
their capacity to formulate the national strategy of the post-Cold War circumstances. 
Moreover, as to strengthen the political superiority, the participation of the bureaucrats in 
the Diet Session was omitted from November 1999; the defence bureaucrats lost their 
major duties.  
Instead, the uniforms of JSDF, who had been long outsiders of the major defence 
decisions, though they were real players, were gradually expanding their presence, though 
there remained a constitutional ambiguity and many constrained for their activities. Since 
the Japanese government determined ‘Basic Guidelines for Japan’s Participation in 
Peacekeeping Forces’ (so-called five principles) in 1992, the JSDF had been increasing its 
international contribution. Domestically, through the various lessons through the Great 
Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake in January 1995,73 the Japanese public come to welcome the 
expansion of the JSDF’s rescue activities at such disasters. Moreover, the simultaneous 
subway attacks with the chemical nerve agent sarin by the cultic terrorists of Aum 
Shinrikyo that occurred in March 1995 reminded the people that only the JSDF could cope 
with these dangers. The JSDF was both domestically and internationally increasing the 
roles in the post-Cold War era.  
Therefore, through several occasional links with Australia, Australia’s defence 
features had appealed to Japanese officials/uniforms in charge.  
For them, strategic linkages which were inventively established between Japan and 
Australia gradually became valuable remnants of the Cold War.  
Not only with the constitutional limitations and political constraints, but also with a 
lack of military knowledge and experience in the international community for so long a 
time, Japan’s perspectives of international security contribution were likely to be 
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self-centred, unrealistic and wishful. The Diet debates over the Japanese contribution to 
the Gulf War and the JSDF's roles in UN peacekeeping operations provided examples of 
such immature ideas,74 whilst Australia seemed have enough experiences and various 
means. In the context of the security relationship with Japan, Australia’s flexible 
operational body seemed able to supplement Japan’s defence capability.  
 
6 Essential roles of New Zealand  
 
Meanwhile, the driving forces which hastened Japan to strengthen ties with 
Australia described in previous sections could all go for New Zealand.  
Indeed, New Zealand has long sustained a unique security policy and developed a 
small but capable defence force. New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) had long been 
symbolised New Zealand’s good citizenship of international community. How to mobilise 
NZDF should totally depend on its public decision through their grass-roots democratic 
procedures, as there were no legal restrictions on the NZDF for their military activities.  
Of the western alliance relationships in the Asia-Pacific region, ANZUS countries 
had the most similar historical and cultural background. As stated before, in spite of a 
difference in motives at the time of the conclusion of the Treaty, the ANZUS countries 
succeeded in cooperating in an extremely effective way in the Cold-War era. The ANZUS 
Treaty came to symbolise the close relationship of the three countries not only in military 
matters but also in political, economic and cultural aspects.  
Moreover, not only as an ally, but as the one of founding members of the United 
Nations, NZDF had contributed to various fields of peace and security.  
For New Zealander, people of such a small country but being proud of its highly 
educated societies, to use forces did not directly mean to defend their territories but mean 
to contribute to the peace and stability of the world, where New Zealanders depend on its 
civilised way of life.75 They believed that the enhancement of the collective security 
mechanism through the United Nations was the best way to achieve their security. The 
NZDF has never fought to defend New Zealand territory but has been proud of its 
contribution towards peacemaking efforts in other regions.  
It was not easy job to balance the reality of New Zealand’s geographic location and 
New Zealanders’ desire to contribute to international peace and security,76 but even though 
the defence budget was restricted, the public assured international acknowledgment of its 
                                                          
74 See Polomka, Japan as Peacekeeper; and Asian Survey, Vol.XXXIII, No.6 June 1993 
75 See details in Donald Denoon and Phillippa Mein-Smith with Marivic Wyndham, A history of 
Australia, New Zealand and the Pacific (Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, 2000); Guy M. Robinson, Robert 
J. Loughran and Paul J. Tranter, Australia and New Zealand economy, society and environment 
(Arnold, London, 2000); Michael King, History of New Zealand (Penguin Books, London, 2003). 
76 See Jim Rolfe, Armed Forces of New Zealand (Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1999), pp.67-90. 
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contribution to international security.  
Accordingly, the actual ratio of troops per populations of New Zealand had been very 
high. In 1984, a year before the ANZUS crisis, the population defended by the one NZDF 
personnel was 260, in comparison with 493.1 by the JSDF, though these tendencies have 
been in relative decline since the 1990s. (See the Diagram 3.)  
In fact, since its departure as a British Dominion, New Zealand developed a style of 
governance that was a marked departure from anything that had been done before. New 
Zealand which was the so-called ‘social laboratory’ had boldly brought up numerous 
political/economic/social challenges and some of them stimulated Japan into action.77 The 
most recent case was of privatisation of post offices, which was introduced in 2007. Defence 
and security may not be any exception and Japan could learn many lessons through New 
Zealand’s security experiences.  
New Zealand should join the alignment of JANZUS.  
First, as a fellow democracy, New Zealand must be much better than India. In the 
new Japanese diplomatic horizon, which Abe and Aso indicated, if one of the quartets was 
New Zealand instead of India, it might be widely accepted, at least practically worked. If 
it’s goal was the importance of strengthening partnerships with countries that share 
fundamental values such as democracy, rule of law and basic human rights, New Zealand 
could not be ignored. Moreover, as the New Zealand defence authorities took particular 
pride in New Zealand’s history of fighting for the British Empire in other wars,78 Japan 
might be happy with this grouping in the glorious memory of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. 
However, New Zealand feels the same as Australia does for whales and uncomfortable with 
Japan’s whaling in ‘whaling sanctuary’. If such different attitudes become exaggerated, the 
alignment of ‘same values’ might be lesser.  
Second, of the contributions as allies, both Japan and New Zealand are similarly 
restricted by different reasons. New Zealand has been facing several dilenmas in its 
security policy. Since the ANZUS crisis in 1985, New Zealand could not participate in joint 
excises which include the United States, whilst it has continued to rely on security links 
with Australia.79 Through this link, New Zealand has maintained its status as an ally of 
ANSUS. With the end of the Cold War the international environment which the United 
States and New Zealand took for granted had changed greatly and the progress of 
                                                          
77 See examples in Roger Peren ed., Japan and New Zealand: 150 Years (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Tokyo, 1999), which was published as one of initiatives taken by former Prime Minister of Japan 
Tomiichi Murayama, known as the Peace, Friendship, and Exchange Programme, which was started 
in 1994. It was a memorial co-production by two countries on the fiftieth anniversary of the end of 
World War II. To that volume, not a few academics of both Japan and New Zealand contributed and 
appreciated the established favourable relationship between Japan and New Zealand. They were 
proud of numerous efforts of the people who had achieved the remarkable interdependence of two 
countries in the various fields. 
78 Jim Rolfe, Armed Forces of New Zealand, op. cit., pp.1-11. 
79 The Close Defence Relations (CDR) with Australia came into effect in 1991. 
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technology made it no longer necessary for most US warships to carry nuclear weapons.80 
Then, New Zealand has consistently tried to improve its links with the United States. 
During the Gulf War in 1991, New Zealand sent a medical team and transport aircraft and 
cooperated with the US-led multinational force, gaining definite US praise.81 ‘Self-reliance 
in the Partnership’ was its preferred strategy which was chosen as the result of a 
compromise.82 In 2001, New Zealand did not act on the basis of the US alliance but it made 
the political decision to assist in the US led war on terror. In 2003, it supported Iraq’s 
reconstruction independently. However, the anti-nuclear policy had achieved national 
consensus in New Zealand, the ANZUS alliance has been continuing in losing its original 
function. Interestingly, the basic idea of political decisions for these agendas in Japan and 
New Zealand was the same. As did Japan, New Zealand made a commitment to help fight 
the war on terrorism and, whilst it did not send soldiers into combat in Iraq, its forces had 
been engaged in reconstruction assistance there. Therefore, for Japan to work with New 
Zealand seems natural.  
Third, New Zealand has been one of the most active members in the multilateral 
institutions. New Zealand believed that the rules-based multilateral system, international 
law, human rights, disarmament and arms control must be important for its international 
interests. Therefore, New Zealand has contributed to global security and peacekeeping 
through participation in the full range of United Nations, together with making efforts on 
institutionalising the region. Moreover, New Zealand is pursuing other appropriate 
multilateral peace support and humanitarian relief operations. The United Nations 
Charter is central to New Zealand’s security policies and New Zealand will continue to 
share the burdens to fulfil their obligations under the UN Charter. In addition, through 
taking more various means and opportunities in the United Nations or other international 
organs, New Zealand has been trying to contribute more to the field of arms control and 
disarmament. In the United Nations, which continues to face major challenges, Japan, too, 
has been aiming to play responsible roles in global arena. Though recent multilateral 
approaches are focussing on particular objectives, in addressing the proliferation threat, 
not only the former non-proliferation regimes such as Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) and 
                                                          
80 On 28 September 1991, US President George H. W. Bush announced in connection with a proposal 
for nuclear arms reductions, that ‘in normal circumstances, we will unilaterally withdraw tactical 
nuclear weapons loaded on naval vessels’. In response, on 30 November, Prime Minister Jim Bolger 
quickly noted that ‘the unilateral withdrawal of tactical and cruise missiles contained in President 
Bush’s proposal removes a factor that has caused a cooling of our bilateral relationship’ and then 
stated ‘it is now New Zealand’s turn to take the initiative. We will probably review the anti-nuclear 
legislation’. (Mainichi Shimbun, October 1, 1991) 
81 Australia also sent forces: a medical team (on the US hospital Ship Comfort), the destroyer Brisbane, 
the frigate Sydney and the mine disposal tender west Oralia. 
82 See the defence objectives compared: 1987-1991, for instances, in Steve Hoadley, ‘New Zealand’s 
Regional Security Policies in the ANZUS States’ in Richard W. Baker ed., ANZUS States and their 
Region (Praeger, Westport, 1994), pp.46-47. 
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International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), but PSI, a mechanism to strengthen 
international co-operation against trafficking in weapons of mass destruction and their 
delivery systems is one of the new initiatives. Moreover, New Zealand, together with Japan 
and Australia, has been contributing funding to the Global Partnership against the Spread 
of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, launched by G8 Leaders in 2002 and these 
supports may go towards a chemical weapons destruction project in Russia and further 
tightening the export controls. The cause of non-proliferation would receive its greatest 
boost from serious engagement on disarmament by the nuclear weapons states and 
avoidance of further vertical proliferation. New Zealand has stepped up its efforts to 
promote disarmament through its active membership of the New Agenda Coalition. As the 
Coalition will play a key role in the run-up to NPT Review Conference. More efforts by 
Japan in this field might be expected.  
Fourth, New Zealand has been very keen in concert with the enhancement of its 
status in the international society; New Zealand has been actively cooperated in the effort 
of the United Nations to maintain international peace. Contributing to peace initiatives in 
the global arena has been its political tool for that purpose. Maintaining New Zealand’s 
capacity to participate militarily in appropriate UN and other coalition activities, the 
NZDF could make an important contribution in pursuit of New Zealand’s wider national 
interests when working in partnership with foreign policy. Alliances aside, New Zealand 
has expanded its involvement in international peacekeeping activities in years.83 As ‘New 
Zealand’s involvement, too, in international affairs required the support of a well-judged 
defence policy, though it was fortunately not to face any direct threat’,84 defence priorities 
can only be determined on the basis of policies firmly rooted in a national strategy. As 
former Prime Minister Helen Clerk stated to the troops returning from Iraq, ‘you are all 
diplomats’, these missions of armed forces become primarily important not only for the 
peace of Iraq but also for the wider its national interests. The defence forces should not be a 
domestic political tool but can utilise its capabilities for diplomatic purposes or for wider 
perspectives. Japan could learn a lot from this strategic thinking.  
Fifth, the country and its military are small, but New Zealand is relatively rich in 
experience in military cooperation and quickly responds to various contingencies. New 
Zealand, after the ANZUS crisis, chose a path that distanced itself from global alliance 
relationships by adopting a policy of self-reliance, with emphasis on its own context and 
                                                          
83 New Zealand has been involved in a wide-range of peacekeeping activities including participation in 
United Nations sanctions monitoring forces in the Gulf, military personnel on stand-by for the UN 
weapons inspection monitoring effort in Iraq, deployment of technical advisers with the Laos 
Unexploded Ordnance programme, deployment of peace monitoring staff in Bougainville and the 
deployment of a UN mandated peacekeeping force to East Timor, etc. In addition, New Zealand 
dispatched its army resources to Kosovo in the former Yugoslavia as the British Army deployed. 
84 New Zealand Government, The Defence of New Zealand 1991: A Policy Paper (GP Print Ltd., 
Wellington, 1991), p.5. 
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that of the region. In addition to the international peace keeping activities, it tried to 
develop an independent regional cooperation with some Pacific islands. Enunciating the 
objective of ‘a minimum credible defence force’, the New Zealand Armed Forces must be a 
good ‘all-rounder ’.85 However, in 1990s, New Zealand could not help reducing the defence 
resources doe to budgetary pressures, though its international policy had wider 
perspectives and the government required the traditional military roles. The real cost for 
these activities was high. In reality, ‘this (forced) to rationalise the tension between wide 
interests and limited resources’.86 Therefore the core concept of the NZDF’s capacity 
became to participate effectively in peacekeeping operations as a competent military 
force. 87  New Zealand’s involvement in Bosnia, Bougainville and East Timor offered 
important lessons for such defence engagements. Especially, New Zealand’s involvement in 
the East Timor crisis and its military contribution to INTERFET satisfied both the New 
Zealand public and defence authorities. The East Timor-type of military contribution was 
considered ‘appropriate’ for New Zealand and the experience was examined for lessons to 
be learnt. Moreover, as cooperation between the NZDF Joint Force Commander and his 
Australian counterpart was smooth, all NZDF force elements were able to inter-operate 
with force elements drawn from a wide range of countries. In this context, the internal 
security assistances of New Zealand, too, together with Australia to Pacific islands, such as 
Fiji and the Solomon Islands were successful cases of an army-centred contribution by 
NZDF. If New Zealand supplements Japan’s activities, Japan could produce substantial 
results without providing much in strictly military terms. A large number of countries 
currently are involved in reconstruction assistance and support in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
Since Japan’s constitution and the limited capability of the JSDF preclude direct 
involvement in activities to maintain order in those countries, the JSDF is, instead, 
engaged in nation-building activities. New Zealand, having focused for the past few years 
on strengthening its ground forces and increasing its participation in PKO and 
international reconstruction support, is able to function in ways that the JSDF cannot, and 
thus the two can operate in complementary ways. As the area which JSDF is trying to 
expand now is mostly that which NZDF is familiar with, there are several cooperative 
activities in reality. The joint training for some operations in the UN peace-keeping 
operations is the one of the possible cases, because the shortages of particular skills of 
soldiers for new missions become common agendas.  
In sum, one way to strengthen security ties between Japan and Australia would be 
to incorporate New Zealand into Japan-Australia, or into Japan-Australia-U.S. security 
                                                          
85 New Zealand Government, Defence of New Zealand: Review of Defence Policy 1987 (V. R. Ward 
Government Printer, Wellington, 1987), p.20. 
86 New Zealand Defence Force: Corporate Plan 1993-4 (Ministry of Defence, Wellington, 1993), p.44. 
87 Inquiry into Defence Beyond 2000: Interim Report of the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade 
Committee, presented to the House of Parliament, November 1998, p.6 
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arrangements. That would result in JANZUS arrangements. This combination could be 
highly productive, insofar as Japan, Australia, and New Zealand complement each other in 
terms of military capabilities. Their collaboration would be practical and effective, 
particularly since New Zealand is now reorienting its military capability to focus more 
heavily on ground forces and is moving toward increasing its international participation 
through PKO activities. In the triad of Japan/the United States/Australia, only Japan does 
not join in combat operations and thus its restrictions appear out of synch with the others, 
but if New Zealand were to be added, the resulting four-way partnership could become an 
efficient, sophisticated and productive form of international cooperation. New Zealand 
might play an essential role in JANZUS arrangements, which the author will lastly 
suggest in the Section Seven.  
 
7 Towards complementary security arrangements  
 
Before fully materialising the declaration, by the end of 2007, the new government 
was elected in Australia. The Japanese domestic political turmoil had continued by the end 
of August in 2009, when the JDP made the landslide victory in the general election.  
To date, there seem obstacles for further developments: resources, perception gaps,88 
economic pressure, restoration of multilateralism and attitudes for whaling.  
Does it mean that the arrangements are still occasional? Was it just an ad hoc 
political product of the triangle cooperation, which was led by three administrations after 
an extraordinary event? Has it already achieved its political aim for the time being?  
Notably, the defence communities in both countries are ‘on side’ and 
functional/practical/pragmatic motives of Japan are not likely declining.  
First, Australia’s response to the US military presence and to Japan’s security 
situation is of greater importance than for Australia’s own defence. Though the US military 
presence does not directly contribute towards the defence of Australia now, as long as the 
ANZUS treaty is based on the presence of US forces in the Pacific,89 and as long as 
Australia’s primary interest in the alliance lies in continuing to engage US military 
interests in the Asia-Pacific region, the security relationship between Australia and the 
United States should be balanced to reinforce the Japan-US security relationship. With 
regard to security issues, during the Cold War period, Japan could ask the countries of 
                                                          
88 There were a few perception gaps between two, such as of China’s intentions in the speech of the 
Hon. Alexander Downer, MP to the Japan Institute for International Affairs, The Australia-Japan 
Partnership - Growing Stronger Together, 22 March 2005. 
89 'Noting that the United States already has arrangements pursuant to which its armed forces are 
stationed in the Philippines, and has armed forces and administrative responsibilities in the Ryukyu, 
and upon the coming into force of the Japanese Peace Treaty may also station armed forces in and 
about Japan to assist in the preservation of peace and security in the Japan Area'. The preamble of the 
Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States of America. 
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NATO to take on a similar role to a Western ally. However, since the end of Cold War, 
NATO countries no longer play the same roles. ‘The ANZUS [treaty’s] most compelling 
rationale, taken in conjunction with the preservation of the Japan-US connection, yielded a 
deep trough of regional reassurances’.90 Together with Australia, Japan would like to cope 
with the coming US ‘transformations’. It is grateful if Australia could shoulder some 
burden of the US presence, namely relocation from Okinawa. In a sense, it was only 
Australia, which could help mediate the dispute between Japan and the United States if it 
arose because Australia still had the status of an ANZUS partner. Given its close 
relationship with both countries and the capacity to deal with both, Australia could devise 
policies which blunt the friction between Washington and Tokyo. If the importance of the 
Japan-US security relationship in the broader Asia-Pacific context was continuously 
upheld by a power like Australia, it surely had more credence. But if Australia would 
assess the necessity of the US presence in the region in terms of its own defence and try to 
replace the United States in playing a stabiliser role in its own theatre, this assessment 
would wrongly lead it beyond its capacity. Japan and Australia could work more effectively 
and reliably by balancing with the United States and the region. In this context, as stated, 
the US military transformation would not need to be respectively arranged but jointly 
coordinated by Japan and Australia. As South Korea’s reliance on the United States has 
lessened, because of its anti-America/anti-Japan demagoguery, the partnerships of Japan 
and Australia with the United States have become relatively more responsible than before. 
Because the complex domestic political situations make South Korean policymakers face 
difficulties to manage the alliance,91 the Japan-US and Australia-US alliances may be well 
placed to take regional initiatives. The two could work with common diplomacy, sharing 
burdens as allies. Australia could evolve from a dependant ally to a self-reliant regional 
initiator. Japan could evolve from an obedient ally - a free rider - to a regional security 
player. For that purpose, both need to get more interoperability not only through the 
United States but also directly with each other.  
Second, Australia could assist and hasten Japan’s process of determining a new 
defence posture. The specific qualitative and quantitative features required by the JSDF 
had been contained in the National Defense Program Outline in 1976. This 1976 Outline, 
accordingly, was reformulated as the next National Defense Program Outline in 1995, 
reflecting the changes in the international situation after the Cold War, domestic 
considerations were mainly for budgetary constraints, and technical progress after 1976. 
Under post-September 11 circumstances, however, Japan had re-started the process of 
                                                          
90 See William T. Tow, 'Reshaping Asian-Pacific Security', Journal of East Asian Affairs, Vol.8, No.l, 
Winter/Spring 1994, pp.95-6. 
91 Winston Lord urged that the US partners to help pressure North Korea and said that South Korea’s 
approaches might endanger alliance. See in his interview by Bernard Gwertzman, consulting for Council 
on Foreign Relations, on February 13, 2003. [http://www.cfr.org/bio.php?meety=&id=414&puby=2003#p] 
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defence re-orientation and endorsed new one in 2004. This 2004 Outline would recast the 
role of the JSDF from a force dedicated to defending Japanese territory to a force equally 
capable of performing various missions, such as UN peacekeeping operations and internal 
security functions, dealing with massive natural disasters and terrorism.92 (See theoretical 
concept of 2004 Outline in Diagram 5.)  
Japan’s defence objective has long been to maintain a capacity sufficient to deal with 
‘limited and small-scale aggression’. As a result of constitutional constraints and political 
considerations amongst the major countries, Japan’s capacity had always been limited, 
even during the Cold War period. This concept, the so-called ‘basic and standard defence 
capability as an independent state’, was followed in the 1995 Outline. However, the 2004 
Outline paid more attention to various kinds of risks or dangers that might lurk in an 
unstable and unpredictable situation. This could mean new missions, new modernisation 
priorities and new ways of thinking about defence and national security. The JSDF might 
be now staking a claim to a range of non-traditional military missions that include 
low-intensity conflict operations. However, these new missions are similar to those being 
developed by Australia.93 Japan must face difficulties similar to those Australia has faced 
in its coming transition. These include budgetary pressures and heavy expenditure on new 
capital equipment for any new mission. There would be demographic difficulties in 
attracting recruits,94 in maintaining the morale of military forces in an uncertain security 
environment and in providing capable reserve forces for less credible, but possible 
contingencies. These requirements might compete with a popular demand for military 
reductions, which means that the JSDF needs to seek new ways of maintaining military 
effectiveness with smaller forces. In this context, there are possibilities that the Australian 
Defence Force management process could provide Japan with a model. The strengthening 
of joint command and the introduction of Program Management might probably all be 
applicable. Japan can learn much from Australia’s defence restructuring experiences 
through strengthening links in the security field. Australia, with its broad experience in 
military activities, including UN-PKO, need to appreciate Japan’s inexperience in some 
areas. As new projects for missile defence systems highlight commonalities, there might be 
other possibilities for cooperation. For instance, Japan expected that it could share both 
regional and global intelligence as well as cooperating in information-gathering operations 
with Australia. Alternatively, Australia has an advantage of intelligence links with the 
United Kingdom or other international organisations and could contribute to enhance the 
anti-terrorism measures.  
                                                          
92 National Defense Program Guideline for FY 2005 and after (Approved by the Security Council and 
the Cabinet on December 10, 2004). 
93 Department of Defence, Australia’s National Security: Australia Defence Update 2003. 
94 The Japanese male population of recruitment age (18 to 27) peaked at about 9 million in 1994 and 
has been decreasing rapidly thereafter. 
― 48 ― 
Third, Australia’s national security policy of constructive engagement envisages not 
only a traditional military role but also incorporates diplomatic relations, economic 
cooperation and development assistance, measures against non-military threats (drugs, 
refugees, etc.) and reciprocal exchanges of military personnel. Australia’s military links, 
such as cooperative air and maritime exercises with ASEAN countries and, more recently, 
the hosting of combined military exercises in Australia for regional nations, could be seen 
as instructive for the Northeast Asia environment. The development of the security 
relationship between Indonesia and Australia might be an appropriate example, which 
Japan and South Korea could pursue in order to overcome obstacles to future cooperation. 
Australia does not advocate a wider military role for Japan, but a process in which Japan’s 
strategic posture should be blended more with that of other regional players. A wide range 
of reassuring measures that Japan and Australia could take as regional leaders may 
promote regional security. This cooperation could begin as a phased approach to 
longer-term goals, but in the shorter-term would include continuance, perhaps with more 
regular frequency, of existing measures such as joint training, personnel exchanges, joint 
research and joint UN-PKO studies. This cooperation would not be with a view to combined 
operations, but rather it would provide an example to other countries in the region of trust 
building in action.  
In sum, strings of collaboration will be tightened with such pragmatic demands and 
the rationality of Japan’s security policy.  
Japan could not cope with non-traditional threats by traditional means. Not only 
traditional collective defence approaches, which have been prohibited by the Constitution, 
but some case by case arrangements of coalition activities, as evaluated by Australia within 
various opportunities, seem to continue to Japan-Australia security relations.  
Hopefully, New Zealand’s participation in these arrangements will be realised.  
‘Defence’ is a long time-consuming investment. It would take ten or fifteen years, or 
more. Even if the emerging circumstances asked a quick change of defence doctrines and 
operations, it must be done within the defence structure, which was built according to the 
plan made decades ago. Changes of personnel in three services, too, must take some time to 
fully adjust to new missions. Australia/New Zealand’s wide security experiences and 
flexible forces were to supplement Japan’s defence incapability. (Diagram 6 is the 
comparisons of numbers of troops in three services in Japan, Australia and New Zealand 
and clearly shows JSDF’s inflexibility.)  
Actually, Japan still needs to cope with the potential threat and in this context the 
idea of ‘deterrence’ does work for Japan’s security and the core of its defence capability 
must contribute to it. However, Japan’s direction was already fixed beyond the defence of 
Japan. Though the JSDF’s structural change is small, it does not mean a small change in 
security roles in future. Agendas of Japan are primarily that for new roles as an ally, 
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namely enhancement of the Japan-US security relations and those of other three phases 
such as domestic, regional, and global. The pace is not fast but Japan is now aiming at high 
credit by steadily performing its new security roles and the adjustment of its forces. The 
security connections of JANZUS might effect on such objective roles.  
In 2009, there looks to be some need for Japan to form a functional scheme with 
Australia/New Zealand, whilst Japan still has various restrictions to go beyond the status 
quo ante.  
 
Conclusion  
 
In many respects, the initiatives undertaken by both the Australian and Japanese 
Governments in the wake of ‘9.11’ were not surprising. The foundations for a close security 
relationship between Australia and Japan had been already in place. Japan and Australia 
were able to expand the scope and style of security networks through the United States as 
part of a requirement to meet new international challenges. The Memorandum of 
Understanding on Combating International Terrorism between Australia and Japan, the 
Trilateral Security Dialogue at the vice ministerial level took place in 2003, were measures 
for these challenges. The up-graded trilateral linkages made it possible for the hundreds of 
Australian soldiers to protect JSDF personnel in Iraq in 2005. The Iraq example was a 
powerful symbol and illustration of the new security relationship and led the security 
declaration signed on March 13, 2007.  
In essence, the declaration, although not as far reaching or substantial as a full 
defence treaty, was strong on symbolism and was a turning point in Australia-Japan 
regional diplomacy. The JDSC has established a clear framework for security links and 
they will possibly continue to develop. It affirmed the importance of trilateral security 
dialogue with the United States and discussed the need for a peaceful resolution of issues 
related to North Korea (nuclear and humanitarian issues). Emphasis in the document, 
however, was on non-military measures and the wording was non-threatening. It was 
neither a treaty nor an old-style defence pact. The purpose of the declaration was to deal 
with common security interests such as border security, counter-terrorism, peace 
cooperation, exchange of information and personnel and joint exercises and coordinated 
activities. There was an action plan with specific measures (referred to as implementation) 
including the beginning of regular Foreign Affairs and Defence meetings at the ministerial 
level known as ‘two plus two talks’.  
The formal and existing security circle such as the Japan-US alliance or ANZUS was 
a favourable basis for the anti-terrorism cooperation and for the creation of a more stable 
security environment. The shared experiences in the history of Cold War of these countries 
might encourage them to shift to a consultative and cooperative security mechanism. As 
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described, a mechanism to guarantee current peace in Asia-Pacific region is conspicuous by 
its absence. These are all important efforts.  
The author does not propose an alliance among the four countries (Japan, Australia, 
New Zealand, the United States), but recommend the formation of arrangements through 
which Australia/New Zealand can jointly/collectively play several profitable roles and 
jointly/collectively provide public goods for global/regional security. Such arrangements 
were they to be expanded, have the potential to make a positive difference to Japan’s 
security situation. (See Diagram 7.)  
From Japanese security perspectives, JANZUS arrangements might be envisioned 
as something like the series of bilateral agreements known as the FPDA among the United 
Kingdom/Australia/New Zealand/Malaysia/Singapore. The FPDA were signed by former 
Commonwealth countries in 1971, after Britain had completed its military withdrawal 
from Asia (east of Suez except Hong Kong). It was not an alliance, but a set of 
arrangements to provide for supply of materials, military training, and so forth. Similar 
arrangements among Japan, Australia, New Zealand―currently important and former 
American allies―would provide a framework for collaboration and would benefit all of 
them. Within Commonwealth memories, FPDA is continuing several security foundations 
in the region.  
In European theatre, now, NATO is reforming from a Cold War legacy to a useful 
military mechanism for both global and regional purposes. Japan and Australia might be 
reformulated from northern and southern anchors to substantial security partners of 
democratic community in the Asia Pacific region. Japan and Australia/New Zealand could 
work together and contributed not only to the United States but also to their neighbours.  
In building this new ‘Pacific Pact’, the author appreciates that Japan, instead of 
being considered a threat, will emerge as one of the credible mates. The community of 
‘JANZUS (Japan and ANZUS)’ might be a first step in this direction. Through these 
processes, Japan and Australia, together with New Zealand will consequently establish a 
more reliable security partnership.  
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Diagram 1: Defence expenditure (growth rates)  
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Diagram 2: Defence expenditure (per capita)  
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Diagram 3: Ratio of troops per population  
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Sources of Diagram1-3: The International Institute for Strategic studies, The Military 
Balance 1993/1994; 1994/1995; 1995/1996; 1996/1997; 1997/1998; 1998/1999; 1999/2000; 
2000/2001; 2001/2002, 2002/2003; 2003/2004; 2004/2005 (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1994; 1995; 1996; 1997; 1998; 1999; 2000; 2001; 2002; 2003; 2004); The 
International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2005/2006; 2006; 
2007 (Routledge, London, 2005; 2006; 2007) 
 
Diagram 4: Australia’s operation (image)  
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Diagram 5: Defence capability to be maintained constantly in peacetime  
           (conceptual diagram as of December 2004) (regulated in January 2007) 
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Diagram 6: The comparisons of numbers of troops in three services in Japan, Australia and  
New Zealand (from the bottom: Army, Navy, Air Force and Reserves) 
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Diagram 7: JANZUS Arrangements （Image） 
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